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Abstract 
lt is generally agreed that the philosophy of Kant is a tuming point for modem 
philosophy. This corpus provides with us not only a method for analysing the 
nature of human knowledge in general, but also a basis upon which we find a 
possibility to establish antology derived from epistemology. This paper tries to 
understand the principles of this possibility deseribed in Kant's Critique of Pure 
Reason. 
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Bilgi Kuramından Varlıkbilime Geçişin Doğasım 
Anlamaya Dair Kant'ın Katkısı Üzerine Birtakım 
Değiniler 
Öze~ 
Kant'ın felsefesi genellikle modem felsefede bir dönüm noktası olarak kabul 
edilir. Bu küll iyat, yalnızca insan bilgisinin doğasını genel olarak 
çözürnleyeceğiıniz bir yöntem sunmakla kalmaz, aynca üzerinde bilgikuramından 
türeyecek bir varlıkbilim kurma olanaklılığı nı bulacağımız bir zemin de sağlar. Bu 
yazı , Kanı'ın Arı Usım Eleştirisi'nde belimiediği bu olanaklılığın ilkelerini 
anlamaya çalışmaktadır. 
Dr, Uludag University, Department of Philosophy, Lecturer 
•• This paper is mainly based upon a speech delivered at The Epistemological and Ontological 
Problems in Modem Philosophy Seminar, Department of Philosophy, Uludag University, 
November 12- 13, 2007. 
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Anahtar Terimler 
Bilgi Kuramı. Varlıkbilim. Mantık. AşkınsaL Eytişim, Anlak. Us. 
In the division of the Critique of Pure Reason, which Kant calls "transcendental 
dialectic," he is concerned with the nature and validity of speculative philosophy and 
natural theology (Kanı 1998: A293/B350-A704/B732). This is supposed to be the 
special department of pure reason. The epistemological conclusions reached in the 
"transcendental aesthetic" and the ' 'transcendental analytic" are now made the basis for 
a critique of the exercise of pure reason in the realm of onto logy. 
1. The ideas of reason 
Kant distinguishes two fundamental cognıtıve faculties, viz. intuition and 
thought, and holds that both are essential to knowledge. He now distinguishes two 
different faculties under the head of thought, and calls them understanding and reason. 
The categories and the pure principles which in vol ve them belong to understanding, and 
have been dealt with in the " transcendental analytic." Kanı holds that there are other 
concepts peculiar to reason. He calls them ideas (A3 12/B368). The "transcendental 
dialectic" is concerned with reason and its ideas, and with the a priori arguments, 
involving these ideas, by which speculative philosophers and natural theologians 
profess to prove important ontological propositions. 
It must be u nderstood that Ka nt is here us ing the word s "reason" (A 131/B 169) 
and "idea" ina special technical sense. The fırst thing is to see what he means by them, 
and how he supposes reason and its ideas to be related to understanding and its 
categories. 
The essential point seems to be this . In ordinary practical thinking and in natural 
science we are continually presented with certain series of terms, which we seem to be 
able to pursue as far as we !ike in thought without coming to any natural end-term or 
li mit the two most important types of such series are the spatio-temporal and the causal. 
Each of these gives rise to two cases. ( l a) Any extension or duration seems to be part of 
a larger extension or la nger duration, and there seems to be no intrinsic maximum or 
upper limit. ( l b) Any extension o rduration seems to be composed of sınaller extensions 
or shorter durations and there seems to be no intrinsic minimum or Jower limit (2a) 
Every event seems to be the effect o f some earlier event, and we seem never to reach 
back to any event which isa cause but not an effect. (2b) The existence of any substance 
seems to be intrinsically contingent. We may be able to say that it is a necessary 
consequence of the existence of some other substance, as e.g. the existence of a person 
depends on the previous existence of his parents. But the existence of these other 
substances is just as contingent intri nsicall y. W e seem never to come to any substance 
whose existence is intrinsically necessary. 
Now in ordinary life and natural science these various unending series give us no 
trouble. We follow each one just so far as we need for the purpose in hand, whi le we 
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recognize that it ~out~ have been followed further in the same direction if necessary. 
But the human mınd ı~ so constituted that it cannot help retleering philosophically on 
su_ch serıes, and when ı~ does so it finds them profoundly unsatisfactory. It cannot help 
thınkıng that they must ın fact be completed somehow, that they must have fırst and last 
terms, an~ so on. Now Kant means by "reason" that factor in our intellectual make-up 
whıch wıll not let us rest content with the various unending series which the 
understanding presents to our notice, and which tries to think of each such series as 
somehow ended or completed in a characteristic way. By " ideas of reason" he means 
the concepts of such last terms and completed wholes. Thus the notion of a first event, 
or the notion of the world as a completed spatio-temporal whole, is an idea of reason. 
So too is the notion of an event which is a cause of later events but not an effect of 
earlier events. So too is the no tion of a perfectly simple substance with no parts. So too 
is the notion of a substance whose existence is intrinsically necessary. 
Now not only are there such ideas. Speculative philosophers and natural 
theologians have tried to prove that they have actual application. It is alleged, e.g., by 
indeterminists that human volitions are events which have effects but are not completely 
determined by earlier events. Many philosophers have argued that the human soul must 
be a simple substance, and have tried to prove from this that it is immortaL Again, 
theologians regard God as an existent whose existence is intrinsically necessary; and 
they have put for ward various arguments to prove that there must be an entity answering 
to this description. Thus speculative philosophy and natural theology are speciall y 
concemed with ideas of reason. 
Now we know that no agreement has been reached on these subjects; so we may 
suspect that there is something wrong somewhere. Moreover, there is th~ following 
interesting fact to be noticed. If we compare and centrast mathematics, natural science, 
and speculative philosophy, we notice two things. (1 ) No one in his senses doubts that 
the principles and methods of mathematics are sound, that i ts results are certain, and that 
it continually advances. No one seriously doubts that the princ iples and methods of 
natural science are sound, that i ts results are at least highly probable and are corrigible if 
mistaken in detail, and that it continually advances. But therc are no agreed results, and 
there is no steady advance in speculative philosophy and theology. (2) Yet speculative 
philosophy and theology use the same concepts and the same a priori principles as 
mathematics and natural scie nce. They use the notions of space and time, cause and 
substance, and such principles as the permane nce of substance and the law of universal 
causation. It is therefore very important to discover and to sıate clearly the limits within 
which these concepts and princ iples are valid and fruitful, and outside which they have 
no valid use. 
Kanı claims to have done this in the "transcendental aesthetic" and the 
"transcendental analytic." Fo r he claims to have shown there that space, time, and the 
categories and the principles which involve them, cannot from their very nature be 
significantly used outside the range of possible human seme-perception. But he is not 
content wi th this. He is quite certain that the fa llac i;!s into which speculati ve 
philosophers and natural theologians have fall en are not simply chance mistakes which 
they might have avoided if they had been deverer or luckier. They are intriosic to the 
nature of the human mind. It is natural to any intelligent man to speculate on these 
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topics, and, if he does so, to use arguments of this ki nd about them. Moreover there are 
negati ve as well as positive ontologists. and Kanı holds that their arguments are no less 
fallacious. There are persons who claim to prove a priori that the world cannot have a 
beginning in time or be limited in space (A426/B454). There are persons who claim to 
prove that there cannot be simple substances (A434/B462), that the soul must come to 
an end with the death of the body(A445/B473), that there cannot be incompletely 
determined volitions, and that no such entity as the God of natural theology is 
possible(A452/B480). According to Kanı their arguments are as baseless as those of 
their opponents and for the same reasons. 
Now Kanı always assumes as evident that men could not have a cognitive 
faculty, with charac teristic innate equipment, which served no useful purpose at all and 
was incapable of leading to anything but fallacies. He takes it for granted that there must 
be a right and a wrong use for the ideas of reason. He therefore devates himself in the 
"transcendental dialectic"' to a two-fold task. One is to show in detail that the use made 
of the ideas of reason by speculative philosophers and natural theologians, and by those 
who attempt to reach opposite conclusions by similar a priori arguments, is ınistaken. 
The other is to discover and to state the right use of the ideas of reason in human 
thinking. 
2. The problems of speculative philosophy 
Owing to Kant's passian for taking the divisions of formal logicasa clue to the 
divisions of transcendental philosophy, there is a good deal of artifıciality in the 
arrangemeı:ıt of the material in the "transcendental dialectic." It seems to me that in 
some cases what is essentially the same problem is discussed several times under 
different headings. The arguments for and against the proposition that there is an 
intrinsicall y necessary existent on which the existence of everything else depends are 
discussed twice over. For I cannot see any real difference between the fourth antinomy 
and the cosmological argument for the existence of God. However, the essential points 
are these. 
(1) On Kant's view, the misuse of the ideas of reason leads to three bogus apriori 
sciences, which he calls rational cosmology (A408/B435), rational psychology 
(A343fB401), and speculative theology (A814/B842). Rational cosmology claims to 
prove a priori that the world did or that it did not have a beginning, that it is or that it is 
not limited in extent, that it is or that it is not composed of simple substances. Rational 
psychology claims to prove a priori that the human soul is a simple substance, that it 
survives the death of the body, and so on. Speculative theology claims to prove apriori, 
without using specifıcally ethical or religious premisses and without appealing to any 
alleged divine revelation, that there is a being which exists of necessity and that the 
exıstence of everything else is derived from it. 
(2) According to Kanı one of the ideas of reason, viz. the idea of freedom, is in a 
quite peculiar position (A3JB7). In the Critique of Pure Reason we are given the apriori 
arguments for complete determinism and the a priori arguments for free will. But the 
solution offered by Kanı is that both conclusions may be true. The same person may be 
completely determined in 211 his actions when considered as a phenomenon, but may be 
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undetermined when considered as a no umeno n. Now in his ethical works Kant takes in 
the additicnal prerniss, which seems to him obvious, that a man isa moral agent, subject 
to obl igaıions, and responsible for his deliberate actions. He argues that this entails that 
aman is free as regards his noumenal self , though completely determined as regards his 
phenomenal self. So we can conclude that the idea of freedom certainly does apply 
wiıhin the world of noumena. 
(3) As regards rational cosmology the results of Kant's discussion are purely 
destructive, and they are not supplemented by anything positive in the two later 
Critiques. The only positive feature is this. Kant tries to explain the useful part which is 
played in human thought by the proper use of these ideas o f reason which lead to the 
fallacies of rational cosmology when misused. 
(4) As regards rational psychology the results of the discussion in the 
"transcendental dialectic" are again purely destructi ve. And the same can be said of 
speculative theology. Kant never went back on the conc lusio n that all such arguments 
for the simplicity and immortality o f the soul or for the existence of God are simply 
fallacious. But he also concluded that any arguments of the same type against the 
simplicity or immortality of the soul or against the existence of God are equally 
fallacious. The a priori arguments for and against simply prove nothing and leave an 
open field. Now in the Critique of Practical Reason Kanı argues that, when certain 
ethical facts are taken into account as premjsses, we have positive grounds for accepting 
the immortality o f the soul and the existence of God (Kanı 1999: 238-246). In the 
Critique of Judgment (Ka nt 2000: 23 1 -346), w hi ch is largely co ncem ed with the nature 
and validity of the no tio n of te leology, the question of the argument from design is 
reverted to and discussed at a considerably deeper !eve! than in the Cririque of Pure 
Reason. 
(5) The discussion of the soul in the '·transcendental dialectic" must be taken 
along with Kant's many statements about the self in o ther parts of the Critique of Pure 
Reason, as well as w ith his doctrine in the ethical works. It is a very complicated story 
indeed, and of very doubtful consistency. 
BffiLIOGRAPHY 
KANT, tınmanuel (1998) Critique of Pure Reason, edited by Paul Guyer and Alien W. 
Wood, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
KANT, fmmanuel (1999) Critique of Practical Reason, edited by Mary 1. Gregor, New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
KANT, fmmanuel (2000) Critique of Power of Judgment, trans. by Paul Guyer and Eric 
Matthews, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
